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Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property 
Lorie Graham* 
Stephen McJohn** 
“There is a relationship, in the laws or philosophies of indigenous 
peoples, between cultural property and intellectual property, and [] 
the protection of both is essential to the indigenous peoples’ cultural 
and economic survival . . . .”1  
Michael F. Brown’s Who Owns Native Culture?2 is a thoughtful 
exploration of the issues raised by intellectual property law and 
indigenous cultures. The book gives several detailed accounts of 
disputes, addressing such questions as copyright in the art of the 
Ganalbingu people in the Northern Territory of Australia and patent 
rights in pharmaceuticals derived from traditional knowledge of 
healing plants.3 It succeeds in drawing out many complexities and 
showing numerous perspectives. This paper does not seek to review 
the book, beyond commending it as an intelligent and nuanced 
addition to the literature. Rather, this paper looks specifically to some 
general conclusions the book draws about whether intellectual 
property law is a useful tool to protect indigenous cultures. Brown 
suggests that “judicious modification of intellectual property law” has 
a role to play.4 But much of the book argues against reliance on 
intellectual property, preferring negotiation on the basis of mutual 
dignity.5 Intellectual property law, in this view, threatens the public 
 * Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
 ** Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, Massachusetts. 
 1. Resolution of Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/30, 1992/35 (Aug. 27, 1992). 
 2. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003). A website at 
http://www.williams.edu/go/native supplements the book, providing access to a number of 
related research resources.  
 3. Id. at 44–48, 106–08. 
 4. Id. at 10. 
 5. Id. 
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domain and is ill-suited in many respects for application to 
indigenous cultures. This paper suggests a different way to frame the 
issue, in which intellectual property law, negotiation, and human 
rights precepts work together to address indigenous claims to heritage 
protection.6  
I. SPECIAL INTERESTS, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 
Brown raises concern for the “public domain, which is squeezed 
on one side by the privatizing logic of the world’s corporations and 
on the other by native-rights activists promoting novel forms of 
collective copyright.”7 He thus places the calls for intellectual 
property protection of indigenous cultures within the larger context of 
intellectual property law. Recent intellectual property law public 
debate and scholarship has indeed recognized that the public domain 
is threatened by the increasing reach of patent, copyright, trademark, 
trade secret, and related bodies of law.8 Framed this way, calls for the 
use of intellectual property law to protect native cultures would 
appear to lead to new incursions on the threatened public domain. 
This has considerable resonance in a time of increasing public 
awareness of the privatization of abstractions.9 Brown is right in 
suggesting that any proposals to increase the reach of intellectual 
property protection should consider the effect on freedom to transmit 
ideas, to innovate, and to express oneself. Framing the overall issue 
in this way, however, overlooks some key distinctions between 
special interests, the public domain, and indigenous peoples’ claims 
to heritage protection.  
 6. On use of the term “indigenous heritage,” see TONY SIMPSON, THE FOREST PEOPLES 
PROGRAMME, INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION 20 (1997); Protection of the 
Heritage of Indigenous People, Erica-Irene Daes, U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Doc. E.97.XIV.3, ¶¶ 21–32 (1997) [hereinafter 
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People]. 
 7. BROWN, supra note 2, at 7. 
 8. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1996); LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).  
 9. “With the intellectual community in substantial agreement that the world has too 
much intellectual property, those adopting the strategy of proprietizing existing knowledge and 
unimproved plant genetic resources are in a difficult political position.” Paul J. Heald, The 
Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 519, 523 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/16
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First, it equates the ability special interests have had to shape 
intellectual property law to the calls for protection of indigenous 
cultures, characterizing the public domain as being squeezed between 
the two. But there are many differences in both the political strength 
of the indigenous claims and the position of indigenous peoples, vis-
à-vis corporate power. Second, it is not so much a question of the 
public domain versus corporate and indigenous interests, as it is a 
question of the impact corporate interests have had on the indigenous 
claims. Indeed indigenous peoples’ claims are in many respects more 
properly aligned with the interests of the public. Third, there are 
important questions of discriminatory treatment of indigenous 
knowledge that are overlooked when the issue is framed as such. The 
principle of non-discrimination is an important human rights precept 
that is equally applicable to the protection of indigenous intellectual 
and cultural property. Lastly, the scope and source of the rights being 
advanced by indigenous peoples are quite different than those of 
corporate or special interests. Legal protection of indigenous 
heritages is sought not for pure economic gain, but rather because it 
is integral to indigenous survival. And the source of this protection is 
grounded not in the “privatizing logic” of commercial law, but rather 
in human rights law.  
The last few decades have indeed seen a steady increase in 
intellectual property protection in every area. Patent subject matter 
has been extended to every field of endeavor. Patents now issue on 
subject matter once thought unpatentable: new life forms, business 
methods, and software, to name a few.10 Copyright’s reach has 
likewise broadened to cover things like software, and to provide new 
rights, such as the infamous anti-circumvention rules in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.11 The copyright term has been extended 
 10. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that a life form could 
be patented, and that patent law extended to “include anything under the sun that is made by 
man”); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding 
specifically that business methods were patentable, and generally that there were few limits on 
the subject matter of patents, as long as the invention met the requirements of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and written description); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(affirming breadth of patent subject matter). 
 11. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2000) (containing anti-circumvention provisions, which 
were added to the Copyright Act in 1998 and give considerable new protections to copyright 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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until, for practical purposes, it has become infinite.12 Trademark law 
has expanded from the protection of trade symbols to protection of 
every imaginable symbol, including colors, scents and sounds.13 The 
varieties of trademark protections have increased from mere 
trademark infringement to just theories of dilution, and anti-cyber-
squatting protection. In addition, trademark infringement itself has 
been richly expanded to include such theories as post-sale confusion, 
initial interest confusion and reverse confusion. In short, intellectual 
property law has greatly expanded, largely driven by the special 
interests’ role in legislation and in the formulation of international 
treaties.  
But indigenous people have hardly had the same sway as 
corporate interests. Intellectual property law has been expanded for 
corporate interests in a number of sweeping ways. By comparison, 
the few measures that have recognized rights in indigenous cultures 
have been quite limited. In the United States, the most significant 
examples are the Indian Arts and Crafts Act14 and the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).15 
None of these has had an effect on the public domain that is 
significant compared to the legislative grants to industry interests. In 
the international area, indigenous interests have hardly received the 
sort of attention that corporate interests have. The most significant 
holders). 
 12. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003) (affirming the extension of copyright 
term to ninety-five years, thus leaving items published since 1923 under copyright); Stephen M. 
McJohn, Eldred’s Aftermath, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95 (2003). On the 
expansion of copyright, see William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or 
How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661 
(1996); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 
1154 (1998) (on the “seemingly inexorable expansion of copyright”); Pamela Samuelson, The 
Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134. On the difficulties of reconciling expanding 
copyright with freedom of speech, see, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free 
Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign 
Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000); for a broad 
view, see Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715 (2003). 
 13. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American 
Trademark Law, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (2000).  
 14. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (2000). 
 15. Id. §§ 3001–13. See generally Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights, 34 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (2002).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/16
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change in international law is that intellectual property, through the 
TRIPS agreement, has been made part of international trade law. 
Thus, nations that do not abide by the international standards are 
subject to the coercive processes of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) dispute resolution mechanism. Developed nations have put 
considerable pressure on developing nations to gradually adopt such 
norms.16 Efforts to use international treaties to provide protection of 
indigenous cultures, by contrast, have met much more resistance.17 
Thanks to the efforts of indigenous groups and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), both the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the WTO have at least taken some issues 
into consideration.18 But, although issues of indigenous cultures now 
have a seat at the table, they have as yet little concrete recognition.  
There is a second problem in viewing the public domain as being 
attacked on one front by corporations and on another front by 
indigenous peoples. The expansion of intellectual property law has 
not come only at the expense of the general public domain. To the 
contrary, it has cut into specific interests, such as those of indigenous 
peoples. Thus, in many respects, the rights of indigenous peoples are 
more properly aligned with the public domain than opposed. In 
intellectual property, as in other areas, legal protection for native 
peoples is effectively eroding, rather than expanding.  
The political forces that allowed commercial power to decrease 
the public domain are also allowing commercial interests to increase 
at the cost of indigenous peoples. Many of the claims sought by 
indigenous peoples are not claims to something in the public domain, 
but rather claims for protection from corporate intellectual property. 
Folklore or indigenous music, for example, are often not protected by 
 16. See generally Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in 
the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998).  
 17. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF THE INFORMAL 
INTERSESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS 16–19 (2002), at www.treatycouncil.org/new_page_552.htm 
(articulating various objections by some states to Article 29 of the Draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which provides for recognition and control over indigenous 
peoples’ intellectual and cultural property).  
 18. For example, An Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore has been established in connection with WIPO. 
See www.wipo.int. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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copyright.19 But a modern recording containing indigenous music or 
a new book containing folklore may be copyrighted, if it contains 
even minimal new elements (the choices made in the sound recording 
or the editorial additions to the folklore).20 So a commercial interest 
may, in effect, be able to hold copyrights in the products of an 
indigenous group. Similarly, in biotechnology, traditional knowledge 
about the properties of plants may be privatized. Patent law “enables 
broad patents on minor modifications, syntheses, and purifications,” 
such as “plant genetic resources, where patents based on local 
knowledge of plant qualities have become routine.”21  
Other areas of intellectual property likewise show indigenous 
groups seeking not to diminish the public domain but to resist 
privatization. The best known indigenous people’s trademark case 
may be that concerning the trademarked phrase, “The Washington 
Redskins.”22 U.S. trademark law bars protection for trademarks that 
are disparaging of a group of people, just as it bars protection for 
various other disfavored categories of mark.23 The dispute did not 
involve Native Americans attempting to remove something from the 
public domain, but rather to prevent a commercial entity from 
owning rights to a term that disparaged them.  
Patent prosecution is another good example of commercial 
interests being favored at the expense of indigenous peoples. Perhaps 
the greatest problem in patent law for indigenous peoples is not the 
law itself but rather its administration. Many issued patents have not 
 19. See Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A 
Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United 
States, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 769, 819–22 (1999); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity, 18 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 177 (2000). 
 20. Riley, supra note 19, at 175–78 (discussing the “exploitation of a sacred tribal 
creation which has its roots in thousands of years of Ami tradition” by a German rock group 
Enigma, which had digitally incorporated the Ami Song of Joy into “a popular ‘world beat’ 
tune known as Return of Innocence”). 
 21. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community 
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 281 (2001). See 
generally RUSSEL L. BARSH, FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, THE NORTH AMERICAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH INVOLVING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE (2001).  
 22. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Gavin 
Clarkson, Racial Imagery and Native Americans: A First Look at the Empirical Evidence 
Behind the Indian Mascot Controversy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 394 (2003). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/16
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met the substantive or procedural requirements for patent protection. 
When patents are litigated, somewhere around forty percent of them 
are held invalid by federal district courts.24 The dynamics of the 
patent prosecution process tend to contribute to this. A patent 
examiner has limited time to examine the patent claims and the rest 
of the patent application to look at all the relevant prior art and to 
determine whether or not the applicant deserves a patent. It is very 
difficult for the patent office to make such a determination, which in 
theory would include researching the history of the relevant invention 
and looking at every document ever published that was relevant to 
the work. The path of least resistance is certainly to allow the patent 
to issue. Given how expensive it actually would be to conduct 
thorough patent examinations,25 the burden of challenging invalid 
patents lies with those who would challenge them—a multimillion-
dollar task which may not be feasible for an indigenous group. In the 
areas of biotechnology and of traditional knowledge, it is therefore 
possible for companies to effectively patent knowledge. Patent 
quality becomes a huge concern for indigenous peoples. Here again 
the model of the public domain being squeezed between corporate 
interests and indigenous claims is inaccurate. Rather the problem lies 
in corporations removing information from the public domain to the 
detriment of indigenous groups. Reforms that improve the quality of 
patent examination would thus benefit the public domain and also 
indigenous peoples, not one at the expense of the other. 
Another problem with characterizing the conflict as one between 
indigenous claims and corporate interests squeezing the public 
domain is that much of the criticisms by indigenous groups seek 
merely to obtain equal treatment under the intellectual property 
laws—not equal treatment in the sense of matching the special-
interest legislation, but simply in applying the basic rules of 
intellectual property law. Non-discrimination in the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and the protection of law are basic tenets of 
human rights law.26 Yet indigenous groups face significant 
 24. See Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 
(2001). 
 25. See id. at 1497. 
 26. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129–31 (2004). 
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discrimination, particularly in the area of protection of property under 
the law.27 Intellectual property law is no exception. 
Patent law, for example, has been amended to reduce 
discrimination against foreign inventors, but not to equalize its 
treatment of traditional knowledge. U.S. patent laws used to unfairly 
discriminate against foreign inventors. In a priority dispute between a 
U.S. inventor and foreign inventor, the foreign inventor could not 
rely upon activity in her own jurisdiction to support her claims of 
inventorship. So, the foreign inventor was forced to rely on the 
priority date established by her U.S. filing date, as opposed to a U.S. 
inventor who could rely on a priority date established by the 
inventive activity. This distinction was dropped as the U.S. sought to 
conform to the treaties it had signed.  
Compare this to the treatment of indigenous peoples abroad. 
Under U.S. law, if an invention has been described in writing 
anywhere in the world, it is no longer patentable by others. What 
constitutes publication has been very widely construed. For example, 
if a chemical was described in a doctoral thesis and the doctoral 
thesis was put on a shelf in a library somewhere in Germany and 
entered into the library index, that would be sufficient to keep that 
chemical in the public domain.28 The result would be different, 
however, if the chemical had been in use by indigenous peoples in a 
foreign country.29 If the chemical was known and used by an 
Nondiscrimination as a basic tenet of international human rights law is articulated in a number 
of human rights instruments such as the United Nations Charter (I.C. art. 1(3)), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (I.C. arts. 1 & 2), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (I.C. arts. 2(2) & 26), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (art. 2) to name a few. 
 27. See Erica-Irene Daes, Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, U.N. Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 5, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (2001); Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Study on 
the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/28 (1993); S. James Anaya and Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001).  
 28. An American who coincidently discovered the same chemical in the United States 
would not be entitled to a patent on it, even though it would be highly unlikely that the 
American would have the ability to search out that obscure dissertation in a foreign jurisdiction, 
evidenced only by an entry in an index. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 29. Coombe, supra note 21, at 281 (“There is no doubt that the appropriation of traditional 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/16
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indigenous group in South America for instance, it would still be 
patentable in the United States, no matter how widespread, or how 
long standing that use was.30 U.S. patent law thus privileges written 
documentation over social use. An amendment to equalize this 
discrimination would again strengthen, not diminish, the public 
domain.  
Intellectual property law with respect to confidential information 
also gives preferential treatment to commercial interests, by giving 
far greater legal protection to trade secrets than to traditional 
knowledge. In one instance in the U.S., a governmental agency 
sought to reach an agreement with a native group concerning, among 
other things, traditional knowledge.31 The parties agreed that any 
traditional knowledge that was disclosed to the government would be 
held in confidence. Subsequent examination of the agreement by 
government lawyers, however, raised a number of issues including 
those relating to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).32 Even if 
the government agreed to keep the information confidential, it might 
be subject to mandatory disclosure under FOIA requests.33 A far 
knowledge continues and the existing U.S. patent system permits and encourages such 
appropriation to the extent that it fails to recognize foreign prior art unless it is published.”). 
 30. The public use bar to a patent applies only to activity within in the United States. See 
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 31. David Ruppert, Buying Secrets, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 113 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994).  
 32. Id. at 121 n.12. 
 33. See, e.g., Bureau of Land Mgmt., General Procedural Guidance for Native American 
Consultation, Rep. No. H-8160-1, Ch. III, Sec. F, (“BLM Handbook”), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/handbook/h8160-1.html. “One of the greatest barriers to 
completely open consultation discussions is Native Americans’ hesitation to divulge 
information about places that are considered to have a sacred character, or practices that are of a 
sacred or private nature. . . . We must not overstate our ability to protect sensitive information.” 
Id. There are limited exemptions, but they fail to provide adequate protection compared to that 
provided to commercial interests. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 470w-3(a) (2000) (may be able to withhold information about the “location, character, or 
ownership of a historic resource” that is eligible for the National Register if disclosure would 
“impede the use of a traditional religious site by practitioners”); Archaeological Resource 
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470hh (2000), and accompanying regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 7 (2005) 
(permitting “[f]ederal agencies to protect archaeological resources from harm by restricting 
information on their nature and location”). Compare Freedom of Information Act, Exemption 4, 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000) (protecting trade secrets and confidential commercial information), 
with Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (finding 
documents concerning communications between the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of 
Reclamation and the Klamath Tribe relating to water rights not exempted from disclosure under 
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different result would likely arise for the confidential, valuable 
information of a corporation. If the information qualified as a trade 
secret, then it would likely qualify for protection against disclosure in 
FOIA requests.34  
Moreover, if regulatory action requires disclosure of a trade 
secret, that may give the business a right to compensation, because 
mandatory disclosure of a trade secret can amount to a taking of 
property for public use (like condemnation of a home to build a 
freeway).35 So providing traditional knowledge legal protection (like 
trade secret knowledge) would do several things. It would somewhat 
even the field with commercial knowledge and it might facilitate 
sharing of the knowledge, because that could be done subject to 
greater protection. 
The greatest objection to equating indigenous claims with 
commercial claims is that they derive from wholly different sources. 
Moreover, the stakes are quite different.36 Commercial claims to 
intellectual property, by and large, seek to serve financial interests. 
The economic considerations that are served are often those best able 
to make their way through the legislative and other policy making 
processes. However, the source of indigenous claims is quite 
different. Legal protection for certain aspects of native cultures is 
Exemption 5 as “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters”); Shannon Taylor 
Waldron, Trust in the Balance: The Interplay of FOIA’s Exemption 5, Agency-Tribal 
Consultative Mandates, and the Trust Responsibility, 26 VT. L. REV. 149 (2001) (criticizing the 
Court’s decision as being volatize of, among other things, the federal-tribal trust relationship).  
 34. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (exempting from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”). 
 35. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 680 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 36. Shuba Ghosh, Reflections on the Traditional Knowledge Debate, 11 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 497, 497 (2003). 
Even though these tensions are played out in the arena of intellectual property, it is 
important to recognize the difference between the traditional knowledge debate and 
other debates over the expansion of intellectual property in other areas, such as with 
academic culture or with the Internet. The traditional knowledge debate occurs in the 
context of a culture clash between the developing and developed worlds, between 
different social structures in the South and in the North (as well as structures within 
those two regions). The questions of whether an artifact of traditional knowledge 
should be owned and of who the owner should be determine issues of development, 
sovereignty, and control over resources. 
Id. at 497 (citations omitted). 
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grounded in principles of self-determination and international law.37 
Indeed, indigenous groups seek intellectual property protection in 
order to promote their own cultural survival, and as a by-product of 
their own claims to self-determination. In a United Nations report on 
the “Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People,” special 
rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes emphasizes this important link between 
protection of indigenous heritages and the right of indigenous peoples 
to exist as “distinct peoples” in control of their own destinies:  
The protection of cultural and intellectual property is 
connected fundamentally with the realization of the territorial 
rights and self-determination of indigenous peoples. 
Traditional knowledge of values, autonomy, or self-
government, social organization, managing ecosystems, 
maintaining harmony among peoples and respecting the land is 
embedded in the arts, songs, poetry and literature which must 
be learned and renewed by each succeeding generation of 
indigenous children.38 
Thus, indigenous claims have a much sounder basis in many 
respects, even though to date their political success has been less in 
the world’s rule-making bodies.39 Finally, some indigenous claims to 
 37. Self-determination is an evolving legal precept that at minimum guarantees “all 
peoples” the right to “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), art. 1 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See generally ANAYA, supra 
note 26, at 97–128; ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL (1995). While the scope of that right has been the subject of much debate, 
international law, as it stands today, seems squarely on the side of the protection and 
enhancement of indigenous cultural identities. Id. at 131–41; see also Lorie M. Graham, 
Resolving Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 385 (2004); 
Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: Translating Self-
Determination “Into Practice” and “Into Peace,” 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 455 (2000). 
Support for this position can be found in numerous international treaties and declarations. See, 
e.g., ICCPR, art. 27 (affirming the rights of persons belonging to “ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
minorities” to “enjoy their own culture” in “community with other members of their group”); 
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, UNCED, art. 8(j), 1992, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/Bio.Div./N7INCE.5/4 (1992) (obligating contracting parties to “respect, preserve, and 
maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities”). Other 
scholars have made similar claims relying on domestic law and policy. See, e.g., Riley, supra 
note 19, at 205. 
 38. Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 
 39. However, some international bodies have begun to take note of indigenous peoples’ 
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intellectual property protection can be viewed as a very partial form 
of reparations for past wrongs.40 At the very least, governments have 
begun to recognize “the requirement of affirmative action to secure 
indigenous cultural survival,”41 which may well include changes to 
intellectual property law. Thus, even to the extent that indigenous 
claims might diminish the public domain, they can, among other 
reasons, be justified because they serve to build and preserve that 
very public domain.  
A related concern is the source of the public domain. One strong 
justification for limiting intellectual property protection is that 
authors and inventors necessarily rely on the public domain. Any 
novelist or software developer uses concepts, tools, ideas, and 
expressive elements created by others. Because all authors and 
inventors take from the public domain, they have less room for 
complaint when elements of their respective contributions are made 
concerns as they relate to intellectual property. See, e.g., Report on the Roundtable on 
Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge (Geneva, Nov. 1–2, 1999), WIPO/IPTK/RT/ 
99/7 (May 4, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/folklore/ 
tkrt99_7.htm; Report on the Third Session, WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore (Geneva, June 13–21, 
2002); WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/17 (June 21, 2002), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/ 
en/meetings/2002/igc/wipo_grtkfic_3_17.htm. Moreover, as Professor Anaya so aptly 
demonstrates in his book, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, “international law, 
although once an instrument of colonialism, has developed and continues to develop, however 
grudgingly or imperfectly, to support indigenous peoples’ demands.” ANAYA, supra note 26, at 
4. 
 40. Widespread and systematic denial of indigenous peoples’ rights to their tangible and 
intangible property has resulted in a denial of their fundamental right to exist as distinct 
peoples. See, e.g., Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of 
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 14, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (July 1993); Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 
6. Such violations may well give rise to claims of reparations under international law. See 
generally Theo van Boven, Final Report, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Escor, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993 (July 1993); Theo van Boven, Revised Set of Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Escor, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 
(1996); cf. Lorie M. Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 LEGAL STUD. 
F. 619, 622–23 (2001) (discussing how particular statutes may constitute a form of partial 
reparations).  
 41. ANAYA, supra note 26, at 103. “Comments by governments . . . and other 
international bodies, as well as trends in government initiatives domestically, indicate broad 
acceptance of the requirement of affirmative action to secure indigenous cultural survival.” Id. 
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available for copying by others. This argument has less force with 
respect to traditional knowledge and folklore, where elements have 
often been developed without borrowing from the public domain of 
other societies. For the same reason, the risk of overprotection of 
intellectual property is different with respect to indigenous peoples. 
All authors and inventors build on the public domain. Intellectual 
property protection thus should balance the incentives given to 
authors and inventors against the costs of that very protection to 
authors and inventors. But where indigenous culture has not drawn in 
the same way on that common domain, the balance is different. 
Indeed, because intellectual property rights can be seen as a very 
partial form of reparations, it is hard to imagine that there would ever 
be excessive compensation.  
In addition, as Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder incisively 
show, the public domain may benefit some more than others.42 In 
theory, the public domain is a rich resource of ideas available to all. 
Indeed, a vibrant public domain is essential to creativity in every 
field. But expansion of the public domain may mean different things, 
especially in the case of indigenous peoples. In particular, “differing 
circumstances—including knowledge, wealth, power, and ability—
render some better able than others to exploit a commons.”43 Thus, if 
such elements as traditional knowledge and folklore are completely 
within the public domain, the commercial interests able to exploit 
them most efficiently could benefit most. As Chander and Sunder 
show, the present balance of intellectual property law gives 
protection to the knowledge generated by developed countries, while 
tending to leave open to all the knowledge generated by developing 
countries and indigenous peoples. Such a balance should be changed, 
even if it alters the contours of the public domain.44 
 42. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004). 
 43. Id. at 1341. 
 44. Native Culture notes the disparity, but describes it as “symptomatic of broader social 
realities, not a failure of intellectual property law as such.” BROWN, supra note 2, at 236. But a 
great failing of intellectual property law is that it tends to protect the knowledge that developed 
countries produce while leaving unprotected the knowledge produced by developing countries 
and indigenous people. See generally Chander & Sunder, supra note 42. 
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II. THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Who Owns Native Culture? focuses on refuting what it terms 
claims for “Total Heritage Protection,” characterizing that as the 
attempt to place entire indigenous cultures “off-limits to scrutiny and 
exploitation.”45 A lesson of twentieth-century history “is that there is 
reason to be wary of totalizing solutions to complex social 
problems.”46 The century was “littered with the ruins of failed utopias 
that caused untold human misery.”47  
This focus may well miss the mark in terms of the linkages 
between human rights and the protection of indigenous intellectual 
and cultural property. For instance, the book describes the U.N. 
report on “The Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People” as “a 
canonical text that makes the case for Total Heritage Protection.”48 
However, viewed through a different lens, this and other related 
reports place indigenous claims in context.49 As one noted scholar has 
stated: 
Specific historical experiences and current political struggles 
provide the relevant context for considering [indigenous] 
claims of cultural appropriation. Only by situating these claims 
in this context can we understand how supposedly abstract, 
general, and (purportedly) universal principles . . . may operate 
as systematic structures of domination and exclusion. An 
evaluation and judgment of Native claims of cultural 
appropriation without this knowledge of context cannot but 
reinforce these larger patterns of injustice.50 
The historical and ongoing practices of governments and other 
entities to dispossess Native peoples of their tangible and intangible 
property and assimilate them into the dominate society are well 
 45. BROWN, supra note 2, at 209.  
 46. Id. at 8. 
 47. Id. (citing ROBERT CONQUEST, REFLECTIONS ON A RAVAGED CENTURY 18 (2000)). 
 48. Id. at 209. 
 49. See Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 
 50. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, 231 
(1998); cf. Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND 
SOCIETY 247 (Michael Brant & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
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documented.51 Equally relevant to any analysis of indigenous claims 
to cultural heritage protection is an understanding of how Native 
cultures are inextricably connected to their identity as a people.52 
Thus, as the Daes report concludes, international and domestic 
measures may well be necessary in order for “indigenous peoples to 
retain control over their remaining cultural and intellectual, as well as 
natural wealth, so that they have the possibility of survival and self-
development.”53  
Moreover, the likelihood of total legal protection of indigenous 
cultures is remote. There is little chance that that such broad-ranging 
cultural protection would become standard.54 As noted above, legal 
protections for indigenous cultures are few and far between. Attempts 
to pass the far greater protections implied by “Total Heritage 
Protection” would, in many areas, meet the same powerful political 
forces that have had considerable success in shaping intellectual 
property law to serve industry interests. International trade 
negotiations are instructive. Developing nations have been hard-
pressed, seeking concessions in some areas (such as merely opening 
their markets to free competition in agricultural products) in 
exchange for agreeing to move toward similar intellectual property 
law regimes. Indigenous groups, which may not have the growing 
markets to offer, are hardly likely to receive the vastly greater 
 51. See, e.g., Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6, ¶¶ 18–20 
(1997). 
 52. See, e.g., Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty 
Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 191 (2001); Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native 
Sovereignty and Property in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291 (2001).  
 53. Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6, Preface.  
 54. As one commentator put it, referring to traditional knowledge (TK): 
It seems highly unlikely that a new framework to protect TK will be inserted into 
TRIPS anytime soon. And since the United States is determined to prevent a WIPO 
convention on TK that could then be incorporated in TRIPS, this is unlikely to happen 
even in the more distant future. At best, minimalist measures to safeguard TK from 
misappropriation could conceivably be agreed upon. A greater danger is that trade 
negotiators will sacrifice the interests of traditional knowledge holders once 
concessions in other areas of intellectual property or other trade-related issues are 
secured in return. 
Graham Dutfield, Trips-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 233, 273 (2001). 
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agreements that such “Total Heritage Protection” might entail. 
Supposed claims for Total Heritage Protection are hardly a threat to 
the public domain. It is about as likely that there would be total land 
reparations, with settler societies like the U.S. handing back their 
entire territory to the aboriginal inhabitants. 
Rather, the question is whether intellectual property protection for 
indigenous culture will be fashioned at all. Brown, like others, 
questions whether intellectual property law is suitable for use as a 
tool to protect indigenous cultures. He raises several features of 
intellectual property law that might make it ill-suited for such 
application. Intellectual property law, especially in the United States, 
serves financial interests, as opposed to protecting cultural interests.55 
Moral rights have consistently been paid much less attention than 
financial interests in intellectual property law.56 In addition, he 
contrasts the individualistic approach of intellectual property law 
(granting rights to individual authors and inventors), to the sort of 
collective rights that might best be used in such areas as folklore and 
traditional knowledge. The book also characterizes advocates as 
seeking novel and untested forms of intellectual property. This 
section suggests that such obstacles are not as great as they might at 
first appear. Intellectual property law has been readily adapted to new 
subject matter and to various types of group production and 
ownership. 
Much has been made of the apparently individualistic bent of 
intellectual property law. Group rights, by contrast, have been 
deemed alien to the basic framework of such laws. Such arguments 
have been raised in opposition to the United Nations Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which provides: 
“Indigenous Peoples have the right to own and control their 
intellectual and cultural property including indigenous sciences, 
technologies, genetic, seeds, medicines, flora and fauna, languages, 
literature, designs and visual and performing arts.”57 If groups were 
granted rights in folklore or traditional knowledge or other cultural 
elements, the argument runs, there could be intractable problems, 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 29. 
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such as determining the appropriate group, arbitrating differences in 
opinion about exercising the rights, and providing a means for other 
to deal with the group to seek permission to use the cultural elements.  
But intellectual property law has long dealt with the very same 
issues. There are many areas in which intellectual property rights are 
both created and held by groups. A movie, for example, may be the 
product of creative contributions from dozens or hundreds of 
directors, writers, actors, costumers, special effects technicians, and 
more. Inventions from pharmaceuticals to software to aeronautics all 
require input from many people over a long period of time. 
Trademarks often act as a banner giving an illusion of unity to vast 
international enterprises. The rights to copyrights and patents are 
often held by corporations with millions of shareholders.  
A recent change to U.S. patent law shows how the individualist 
cast does not fit even modern industrial society. An inventor is 
entitled to a patent only if her product or process is significantly 
different from what others have already done, as opposed to an 
obvious step. But that rule can be difficult to apply to the product of 
teamwork. Any individual’s contribution might not qualify as a 
sufficient advance, if the other teammembers’ work counted as 
preexisting work. The U.S. patent law was amended to treat teams, in 
effect, as a single inventor for determining whether a claimed 
invention was sufficiently “nonobvious.”58 Thus, individual 
inventorship is hardly an unchangeable bedrock of intellectual 
property law. Rather, intellectual property law has adapted—
especially where the affected interests were able to get legislation. 
Trademark law also serves groups. A trademark can be a unifying 
symbol for a vast enterprise—think only of Coca-Cola, McDonalds, 
or the United States Postal Service. Particular types of trademarks 
can further specifically serve to promote the interests of groups. A 
union can use a “collective mark.”59 A certification mark can be used 
to demonstrate that a product or service conforms to the standards 
shared by a group. Thus, the OSI Certified mark can be used on 
software to show that it conforms to the principles of the open source 
 58. The Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108–453, 118 Stat. 3596. 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
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software movement—a large, dispersed group united mainly by 
certain beliefs about computer programs.60 Accordingly, trademark 
can also fit into protecting group rights with respect to indigenous 
peoples. Indeed, as evidenced by the Indian Arts and Crafts Act,61 
and by numerous marks registered to indigenous groups, such use of 
trademark is growing—and affecting the nature of trademark law 
itself.62 Intellectual property increasingly must face issues of creation 
by groups,63 and in some respects indigenous peoples are leading in 
this adaptation. 
Even though intellectual property rights are often group rights 
(and the groups can number in the millions), this has not proven a 
great obstacle to apportioning those rights. There are naturally 
disputes over ownership and inventorship, but such disputes are the 
exception. A new pharmaceutical rarely has scientists within a drug 
company fighting over the patent rights, and a new film does not 
usually have a dispute over the copyright. Rather, the ownership rules 
of intellectual property law, along with contracts, corporate law and 
other mechanisms, settle the ownership as agreed by the parties or as 
set out by the law. There is no reason to think that similar results 
would not obtain for indigenous groups, through their own 
mechanisms for governance and dispute resolution.64 In one instance 
in the United States, a group of indigenous nations from the same 
 60. See Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org. 
 61. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (2000). 
 62. Daniel J. Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible 
Traditional Knowledge, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 494–95 (2003) (suggesting that 
“sacred traditional knowledge” could be protected “based on collective or ‘communal’ 
authorship, which already exists in trademark law and related fields”). 
 63. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative 
Internet Art, Joint Works and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257 (1996). 
 64. Riley, supra note 19, at 216 (proposing an Indian Copyright Act, which “(1) is 
flexible enough to include the oral works of indigenous groups, which means significantly 
altering existing copyright requirements; and (2) mandates that disputes over the construction of 
the term ‘collective indigenous work’ be resolved in tribal court, subject to interpretation by 
tribal law and custom”); see also Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and 
Indigenous Peoples: Adapting Copyright Law to the Needs of a Global Community, 7 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51–78 (2004) (proposing “the incorporation of collective and 
communal notions of authorship, the expansion of the originality requirement to reflect these 
forms of authorship, and the application of limits on the duration of copyright protection in a 
broader community context”).  
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region worked together to form a consortium designed to address any 
disputes arising out of the issue of “cultural affiliation” and the return 
of human remains under NAGPRA. Other indigenous groups in the 
U.S. and elsewhere have adopted laws and related mechanisms that 
specifically address cultural resource protection.65 Indigenous groups, 
especially as part of economic development effort, have considerable 
experience in integrating commercial law into their own governance 
systems.66 
With respect to moral rights, Brown quite correctly states that 
intellectual property law in the U.S. has not contained many explicit 
protections for moral rights, as such. Nevertheless, moral rights have 
found protection through the broad types of rights available. Moral 
rights include such things as rights of attribution, rights of integrity 
(protecting against destruction or distortion of the work), and rights 
of disclosure (the right to decide whether and when a work will be 
published).67 Some would also include rights such as the right of 
withdrawal (to take a work such as a book off the market), the right 
to reply to criticism, and “following rights” (for example, the right of 
a painter to receive a percentage of the proceeds if her work is sold, 
even long after she has sold the work).68  
Such rights are not explicitly protected by U.S. intellectual 
property law, but, as commonly noted, can nevertheless be found by 
applying more general rights. If a work is distorted, for example, that 
would likely infringe copyright by creating a “derivative work.”69 
Likewise, distortion of the work could violate the license under 
 65. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: 
Asserting a Place for Indians as Non-Owners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (2005); Angela R. Riley, 
“Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. 
L. REV. 69 (2005).  
 66. See, e.g., Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty Through Agreement, 37 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 537 (2003) (discussing factors a tribe might consider in adopting 
commercial laws and adapting them to the tribe’s own norms). 
 67. ROBERT MERGES, PETER MENELL, & MARK LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 483 (3d ed. 2003). 
 68. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 
11 (1997); Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and 
Analysis, 67 WASH. L. REV. 827, 829–30 (1992). 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (providing that copyright owner has exclusive right to create 
derivative works). 
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which the work was used, giving rise to a claim under contract law.70 
If authorship is misattributed, that could violate trademark law, as 
trademark infringement, false designation of origin, or simply false 
advertising.71 If a work is published without consent of the author, 
that could be copyright infringement—and the Supreme Court has 
given considerable weight to the author’s right of first publication.72 
Likewise, the right of withdrawal can find some protection in the 
author’s exclusive right to make and distribute copies.73 Such rights 
of attribution, integrity, and disclosure could broadly serve the 
interests of indigenous peoples in controlling whether and how 
cultural elements were disseminated.  
To take a very specific example from copyright law, the right of 
termination might find resonance within a copyright scheme for 
indigenous works. Under U.S. copyright law, a grant of rights under a 
copyright may be terminated after thirty-five years.74 If an author 
sells her copyright to a publisher, she has the right to terminate that 
transfer after thirty-five years. Termination gives her back the rights 
under the copyright. Rights of termination are inalienable, meaning 
they withstand even the broadest attempts to make copyright licenses 
irrevocable. The theory behind termination rights is that authors may 
be commercially unsophisticated, lack bargaining power, and have 
certain moral rights in their creations. Thus, despite copyright law’s 
largely commercial role in the U.S., it does go beyond providing a 
framework for commercial transactions, and shows a willingness to 
undo deals in the interest of moral rights, a framework that would fit 
well with using intellectual property to serve indigenous self-
determination. Where indigenous groups could show similar factors 
affecting them, a similar right would be appropriate. 
The subject matter relevant to indigenous cultures, such as 
folklore and traditional knowledge, is also often deemed beyond the 
scope of intellectual property law. But the subject matter of 
intellectual property has never been fixed. To the contrary, it has 
 70. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (1976). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 72. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000) (granting copyright owner the exclusive rights to make 
and to distribute copies of the work). 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). 
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adapted readily to new social practices and technology. As noted 
above, patent subject matter has spread from mechanical devices to 
every type of inventive activity, from biotechnology to ways of 
selling advertising space on web pages. Trademark law has gone 
from protecting a few types of designations to covering any type of 
symbol, whether visual, aural or otherwise.75 The first U.S. copyright 
statute covered a narrow range of published material: maps, charts, 
and books. Copyright now applies to the entire spectrum of creative 
works, from architecture to zodiacs.76 It could likewise adapt to the 
protection of folklore or indigenous art. 
Brown does not categorically reject the use of intellectual property 
law to protect native cultures, despite the many cautions he raises. To 
the contrary, he suggests that some judicious modifications of 
intellectual property law would have a role to play. Rather, his 
skepticism is directed toward the sort of exclusive rights that 
typically come into play with intellectual property. The most 
extended specific proposal he makes is the use of compulsory 
licensing in the area of traditional knowledge that may be used to 
develop such commercial products as pharmaceuticals.77 Compulsory 
licensing, the requirement that commercial interests pay fees in order 
to make use of the knowledge, would permit payment to indigenous 
groups while at the same time permitting the general benefits of 
commercialization. Brown’s proposal is quite consistent with his 
general view that intellectual property law generally is best suited to 
financial concerns, as opposed to cultural issues, and consistent with 
his skepticism of “rights talk” and propertization of culture. But 
indigenous groups seek much more than money. Rather, exclusive 
rights may be more appropriate in some areas, where the associated 
 75. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 373–74 
(1999). 
 76. The treatment of software, in particular, shows the adaptability of copyright. Software 
is far removed from the original copyright subject matter. The Constitution authorizes Congress 
to grant exclusive rights in “writings” to their “authors.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Early 
copyright statutes applied to such things as maps, books, and charts. As software became 
commercially important, there was considerable debate whether a computer program was really 
a “writing” created by an “author.” Likewise, software is largely functional, and copyright has 
always been deemed to protect only expressive elements, not functional ones. But both 
legislation and case law have readily adapted copyright to apply to software.  
 77. BROWN, supra note 2, at 240–41. 
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control would be consistent with the group’s claims to self-
determination—even where economic efficiency may not be best 
served. Compulsory licensing removes control over traditional 
knowledge and cultural elements, leaving only the price to be 
determined. But other approaches could recognize the interest 
indigenous peoples have in control, while balancing other interests. 
For example, one commentator suggests “localized institutions that 
are a mixture of public and private that are a ‘commons’ on the 
inside, and ‘private property’ on the outside. These types of evolving 
and flexible institutions importantly shift the focus from ownership of 
resources to governance.”78 
In the end, Brown’s focus on “Total Heritage Protection” draws 
attention away from the many attempts to devise balanced ways to 
use intellectual property law to protect native cultures while 
accommodating other interests. A number of commentators have 
sought to come up with ways to balance various competing 
interests.79 What these and other proposals suggest is both possible 
and desirable to provide intellectual property protection for 
indigenous cultures. Exactly what those protections might entail must 
be answered in consultation with indigenous peoples themselves and 
in accordance with their customs and beliefs, if they are to be 
effective. 
III. NEGOTIATION AND CULTURAL PROTECTION 
Who Owns Native Culture? calls for reliance on negotiation and 
mutual respect, as an alternative to “rights” incorporated into law.80 
But, negotiation and legal standards are interdependent in the context 
 78. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 247, 331 (2003). As Native Culture notes, sometimes outsiders 
are not aware of such “limited commons.” BROWN, supra note 2, at 239. But supporting these 
commons with intellectual property rights would translate them into widely recognized forms.  
 79. See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
793, 796 (2001) (asserting “that intellectual property law, through modification of its authorial 
and temporal limitations and creation of community-specific protections such as an 
‘authenticity mark,’ has the potential to strike an equitable balance between source community 
rights and the public interest in cultural products”); Riley, supra note 19, at 216–17 (proposing 
a copyright statute that is “specifically geared towards Indian peoples—one which encompasses 
inter-generational, oral traditions, as well as indigenous perspectives”).  
 80. BROWN, supra note 2, at 144–72. 
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of indigenous peoples’ rights and have long had an important 
interplay for several reasons. First, in negotiating for protection of 
indigenous cultures, indigenous peoples have always had much more 
success when they've had some legal power behind them. For 
instance, in the context of NAGPRA, while it may be true, as Brown 
notes, that museums are more willing today to enter into “extended 
negotiations” with Native nations, prior to the passage of NAGPRA, 
museums were rarely, if ever, knocking on the doors of Indian 
country or opening their own archival doors to discuss the issue of 
repatriation with Native peoples. “Professionalism” and “simple 
decency” (which Brown asserts are the primary factors pushing 
archives to the negotiating table)81 are honorable traits, but law has 
gone a long way in helping museums realize the value of those 
traits.82 As Kristen Carpenter notes with respect to legal protection of 
sacred sites, “[a] stronger articulation of [legal] rights may help to 
ensure that the parties even engage in dialogue and work toward 
accommodation.”83 However, as Carpenter further notes, this does 
not foreclose “negotiated approaches” to cultural protection nor does 
it ignore the larger context in which these decisions are being made: 
“The recognition of rights in a vulnerable minority does not require 
reverting to the winner-take-all property law approach . . . . Rights 
have a place in negotiated approaches to legal problems.”84 Second, 
in some matters, negotiation, unless it is to be endlessly repeated, can 
be best fulfilled when the results of negotiation are made into law. 
Similarly, it helps to ensure that the historical and contemporary 
injustices that led to the negotiations in the first place will not be 
repeated. NAGPRA once again provides a nice example. According 
to Suzan Shown Harjo, one of the principle negotiators of NAGPRA, 
 81. Id. at 232. 
 82. See Kate Morris, Strategies and Procedures for the Repatriation of Materials from the 
Private Sector, in AMERICAN INDIAN RITUAL OBJECT REPATRIATION FOUNDATION, MENDING 
THE CIRCLE: A NATIVE AMERICAN REPATRIATION GUIDE, available at http://www.repatriation 
foundation.org/strat.html. 
 83. Carpenter, supra note 65, at 1142–43.  
 84. Id. at 1146. In describing a rights-based approach to sacred sites, Professor Carpenter 
“calls for the recognition of Indian rights in the context of Indian relationships with the 
government, other citizens, and the land itself and in the context of widely shared values like 
religious freedom and cultural diversity.” Thus, contemplating a place for “thoughtful 
conversation” as urged by Professor Brown.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p313 Graham McJohn book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
336 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 19:313 
 
 
 
the law was “intended to provide some small measure of justice for 
native Peoples in the modern era for the generational suffering and 
hardship imposed by [past] policies and practices that outlawed 
Native religions and violated fundamental rules of human decency.”85 
The book is also somewhat inconsistent when it criticizes these 
statutes. For example it points out that the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act86 does not give protection to all indigenous peoples. Rather, its 
protection is limited to artisans of recognized tribes—a valid 
criticism noted by many.87 But negotiations are likely to reach results 
that are partial. So it is perhaps unfair to call for negotiations on one 
hand and then to summarily criticize the results of those very 
negotiations. The solution to the inadequacies inherent in negotiated 
laws, like the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, is not less law, but rather 
modification of those laws as may be warranted. Finally, legal 
protection serves negotiation by helping to put the parties on an even 
footing. Negotiation where one party lacks any leverage is likely not 
to succeed. One example outside the intellectual property context is 
the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement with the Inuit people and 
the Canadian Government.88 The Premier of Nunavut has stated that 
prior to the passage of the 1982 Canadian Constitutional Act,89 which 
constitutionalized indigenous rights, there was “little incentive to 
negotiate and sign a land claim when a subsequent government had 
the power to overturn that agreement if it so chose.”90  
 85. Suzan Shown Harjo, Introduction to AMERICAN RITUAL OBJECT REPATRIATION 
FOUNDATION, MENDING THE CIRCLE: A NATIVE AMERICAN REPATRIATION GUIDE 3 (1996); 
cf. NMAI Not Just a Decoration, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 22, 2004, at A1 (discussing 
the important role that Harjo and others played in negotiating repatriation issues at the federal 
level).  
 86. Indian Arts and Crafts Act, Pub. L. No. 101–644, 104 Stat. 4666 (codified in scattered 
sections of U.S.C. titles 18, 20, 25, and 42). 
 87. BROWN, supra note 2, at 215; Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra 
note 6, ¶ 64. 
 88. Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settement Area and Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of Canada, http://www.tunngavik.com/site-eng/nlca/nlca.htm.  
 89. The 1982 Constitution Act recognized and affirmed “[t]he existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.” Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, 
Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 35(1) (U.K.).  
 90. Gov’t of Nunavut, Premier Paul Okalik, Speaking Notes: Nunavut—North America’s 
Newest Democracy (Dec. 3, 2001), http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/English/premier/press/ 
nand.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). See generally Graham, Resolving Indigenous Claims, 
supra note 37, at 412–20. 
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Similarly, international negotiations will continue to shape 
intellectual property law. The results of those negotiations will be 
influenced by preexisting attitudes toward the relationship between 
intellectual property law and traditional knowledge: 
[T]he choice of forum, the mindsets of the negotiators, the 
extent and impact of cognitive barriers on the policymakers, 
and the participation of the indigenous community in the 
negotiation process will play major roles in determining 
whether governments can create a mutually beneficial solution, 
whether they can promote biological and cultural diversity, and 
whether they can establish a harmonized regime that 
effectively protects folklore, traditional knowledge, and 
indigenous practices.91 
The international negotiations also shape the climate in which 
local negotiations are conducted.92 
If concern for indigenous peoples can become a real element in 
formulating international intellectual property law, the benefits could 
go beyond protection of indigenous cultures. As noted above, such 
negotiations have recently tended to benefit corporate interests at the 
cost of the public domain. They also have tended to increase the 
emphasis on the financial aspects of intellectual property, at the cost 
of its role in protecting moral rights. But intellectual property is not 
merely an aspect of trade protection, notwithstanding its recent move 
to the World Trade Organization. Rather, it can play an important 
role in protecting human rights.  
 91. Peter K. Yu, Introduction, Symposium: Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, 
and Indigenous Culture, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239, 245 (2003). 
 92. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
547, 553 (2003) (discussing how international initiatives toward protection of traditional 
knowledge and folklore have contributed to the making of local agreements “among research 
institutions, companies, communities and non-governmental organizations”). 
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